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 RIGHTS OF NATURE AS AN UNLIKELY 
SAVIOUR FOR THE EU ’ S THREATENED 
SPECIES AND HABITATS 
 A Critical Introduction to a Revolutionary Idea 
 Hendrik  Schoukens 
 1. WHAT IF ? 
 Imagine one of the last wild hamsters, an EU protected species, wandering 
around on an empty and pesticide-ridden piece of cropland in Belgium. 1 
Or take the case of a young she-wolf, straddling the borders between Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Germany. Let us assume a male following her all the way 
into Belgium and the pair having cubs together in spring. Five months later, the 
male reportedly stopped bringing food to the den; the she-wolf had disappeared. 
Rumour has it that some hunters agreed to secretly kill the she-wolf and her cubs 
in order to rid their hunting grounds of  ‘ invaders ’. Th is leaves the male wolf a 
 ‘ lone wolf  ’. 2 
 Who should speak up for these  ‘ harmed ’ species that are strictly protected 
under Union law ? In both instances, our legal order does not allow nature to 
stand up for its own rights. It is to remain voiceless. Nature does not possess 
legally enforceable rights, not even moral rights. Although wolves and wild 
hamsters are protected by the 1992 EU Habitats Directive, 3 they can only be 
indirectly represented in court by environmental organisations or governmental 
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of species without granting them explicit substantive rights ? 4 Faced with the 
underperformance of the existing governance structures, 5 the obscure idea 
of granting legal rights to nature has garnered more attention lately, with 
explicit recognition of rights of nature in numerous jurisdictions, such as 
New-Zealand 6 and Ecuador. 7 With rivers and wider ecosystems being endowed 
with legal personality and legal rights elsewhere in the world, this chapter 
critically engages with this novel discourse and explores to what extent it 
can further the protection of the environment in the European Union. It 
contemplates the specifi c role of law in the fundamental transition to a 
sustainable future, straddling the border between morality, on the one hand, 
and positive law on the other hand. 
 2.  SYSTEMIC DEFICIENCIES AND RIGHTS OF NATURE 
AS A NEW NORMATIVE AND MORAL DISCOURSE 
 Th e starting point of this analysis is the existing EU environmental legislation, 
which is the result of many years of growing environmental awareness. 
Unfortunately, the biodiversity decline in the EU 8 has not yet been stopped in 
spite of minor successes in terms of the recovery of certain large predators. 9 
Poor enforcement and a lack of proper implementation can certainly be 
singled out as the prominent causes of this glaring underperformance. 10 
However, a growing number of authors claim the anthropocentric nature of 
the existing regulatory schemes lies at the heart of their failure. 11 Many critical 
observers would automatically agree that even the much heralded 1992 EU 
Intersentia 189
Rights of Nature as an Unlikely Saviour for the EU’s Th reatened Species and Habitats
 12  Th is is a quote from the oral hearing in the  Case C-115/09 ,  Bund f ü r Umwelt und Naturschutz 
Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, Trianel 
Kohlekraft werk L ü nen (intervening)  Opinion of AG Sharpston , [ 2011 ]  ECR I-03673 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:773 . 
 13  Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters, done at Aarhus, Denmark, 25 July 1998 ( ‘ Aarhus 
Convention ’ ) (1999) 2161 UNTS 447. 
 14  See: Wood, above n. 5, pp. 115 – 117. 
 15  See amongst others:  D.  Boyd ,  Th e Rights of Nature, A Legal Revolution that Could Save Th e 
World ( ECW Press ,  Toronto  2017 ) . 
 16  For an overview, see: D. Shelton,  ‘ Nature as a legal person ’ (2015)  Vertigo –La Revue 
Electronique en Sciences de L ’ environnement (Hors-S é rie 22),  https://journals.openedition.
org/vertigo/16188 . 
 17  Ibid. 
Habitats Directive does not explicitly grant legal rights or personhood to 
endangered  species. And although it can have sharp teeth when eff ectively 
applied, it appears inherently incapable of halting the exacerbated biodiversity 
losses in recent times. In part, this is because the 1992 EU Habitats Directive 
is incapable of reversing the myriad of institutional, legal and policy-related 
lock-ins that prioritize short-term economic gains over environmental 
considerations and extinction risks. It still is easier to win elections with the 
promise of more jobs and economic prosperity than the prospect of saving 
some species from imminent extinction. 
 Thus, the question arises who is to speak up for species whose survival 
is threatened by human actions ? As Advocate-General Sharpston put it in 
the  Trianel case,  ‘ The fish cannot go to Court. ’ 12 Action needs to come from 
stakeholders representing the public interest, such as concerned citizens 
or, as the case may be, non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Within 
the framework of the 1998 Aarhus Convention, 13 environmental NGOs are 
granted standing in environmental cases so as to ensure a better enforcement 
of environmental legislation. But environmental NGOs also have to make 
difficult and tough strategic choices, meaning that not every ecological 
encroachment can be litigated in court. 14 Concerned citizens are often not 
granted automatic standing in environmental cases, which might generate 
certain loopholes in environmental protection. It is therefore not surprising 
to see a growing number of environmentalists becoming increasingly eager 
to champion or at least contemplate a more rights-based approach to nature 
conservation and environmental governance as a whole. 15 Under this novel 
template, the intrinsic value of ecosystems and nature is acknowledged and 
placed at the centre of the legal order. In furtherance of this approach, ecosystems 
are granted legal personhood, meaning that appointed guardians can enforce their 
substantive rights. 16 Likewise, their right to exist is explicitly recognised in 
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 3. WHERE DOES THE IDEA STEM FROM ? 
 Christopher Stone ’ s ground-breaking article  ‘ Should trees have standing ? ’ 18 
is to be regarded as one of the catalysts for the rights of nature movements. 
To quote his own words, Stone was  ‘ quite seriously proposing that we give 
legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called  “ natural objects ” 
in the environment   – indeed, to the natural environment as a whole ’ . 19 Th is 
was no less than a paradigm shift  in the legal discourse back in the 1970s. 
According to Stone, the concept of legal personhood has to be viewed as one 
end of a continuum granting an entity certain rights based on its intrinsic value 
rather than its instrumental or economic value to others. However, the oft en 
prevailing Cartesian and dualistic thinking is notable for reducing nature to a 
mere  ‘ commodity ’ or a  ‘ machine ’ , ready to be explored by scientists and turned 
to good use for mankind. 20 Even so, it is important to understand that Stone ’ s 
approach, which was subsequently translated into a plea for  ‘ biotic rights ’ by 
Nash, 21 was that of a lawyer, not that of a philosopher. Stone had to come to 
terms with the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that had ruled that 
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund lacked legal standing to halt the proposed 
development of the Mineral King Valley in the Sierra Nevada Mountains by 
Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc. 22 He opined that if the Mineral King Valley had 
been recognised as a rights holder, it would have been an aff ected party and the 
Sierra Club might be authorised to represent it before court. 23 
 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court was not swayed by Stone ’ s last-minute 
plea. 24 However, Stone still managed to convince the Supreme Court Justice 
William O. Douglas, who paid extensive lip service to this groundbreaking 
thesis. 25 In turn, Stone further fl eshed out his theory. He argued that 
since streams and species have no rights under the terms of the existing 
normative framework, they do not have standing. Second, they also lack strict 
substantive protection in the face of signifi cant destruction. And even if they 
are indirectly protected through a court ruling, there appears to be no certainty 
that they will ultimately be the benefi ciary of a favourable judicial decision. 26 
In order to remedy these inherent fl aws of the existing legal system, Stone 
proposed a radical new guardianship approach, which would not only enable 
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guardians to initiate lawsuits on behalf of threatened species or ecosystems, but 
also would endow the latter with inherent rights, including the right to exist. 27 
As a result, private citizens are also aff orded the possibility to enforce the legal 
protection duties linked to ecosystems.
 4. A LOGICAL COUNTERMOVEMENT ? 
 Stone ’ s work draws on previous insights from infl uential thinkers like Charles 
Darwin. In his ground-breaking work, Darwin noted that the history of man ’ s 
moral development is to be regarded as a continued expansion of his  ‘ social 
instincts and sympathies ’. 28 In a similar vein, Charles Darwin observed the 
diff erence between humans and other animals to be one  ‘ of degree, not of kind ’. 29 
Likewise, Aldo Leopold ’ s landmark work  ‘ Th e Land Ethic ’, which contemplated 
 ‘ the right to continued existence ’ of not only animals and plants but waters and 
soils as well, clearly impacted Stone ’ s writing. 30 Reference should also be made 
to the Australian philosopher Tom Regan, who explicitly advocated the granting 
of certain substantive rights to animals, including the fundamental right to be 
treated with the respect that, as possessors of inherent value, they are due as a 
matter of strict justice. 31 
 In the past decades we have also noted a sharp rise in the so-called  ‘ Earth 
Jurisprudence ’ movement. One of the most vocal champions of this new 
environmental movement, Th omas Berry, submitted that  ‘ there can be no 
sustainable future, even for the modern industrial world, unless the  … inherent 
rights of the natural world are recognized as having legal status ’. 32 According 
to his approach, mankind is merely a part of nature rather than outside of it. Th is 
approach was subsequently refi ned by authors like Cormac Cullinan. 33 
 Against this backdrop, it is not surprising to see rights of nature specifi cally 
emerge in jurisdictions where indigenous people like the Maori and Native 
Americans are granted more explicit legal recognition. 34 One of the fi rst laws in 
which legal personhood was granted to a river was passed in New Zealand, when 
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the Whanganui River as holding rights and responsibilities equivalent to a 
person. 35 In the provisions of the law, the river ’ s ecosystem is recognised as a 
spiritual living being. 36 A similar evolution has been noted in Ecuador, where 
from 2008 onwards Article 71 of the redraft ed constitution states that Mother 
Nature not only has the right to exist but also to have the  ‘ maintenance and 
regeneration of its life cycles, structures, functions, and evolutionary processes ’ 
respected. 37 Rights of nature have recently also manifested themselves in the 
United States and Columbia, where, outside the specifi c context of the struggle 
of indigenous peoples for more recognition and political rights, 38 the clear-cut 
link between rights of nature and non-Western approaches to nature cannot 
be denied. 
 5. WHAT DOES IT EXACTLY ENTAIL ? 
 In recent years, Earth Jurisprudence has been translated into positive law in 
an increasing number of jurisdictions, bridging the gap between moral and 
legal rights. Th e new normative framework of granting legal personhood has 
yielded diff erent manifestations of legal rights of nature, which are succinctly 
presented below. 39 
 5.1. SCOPE OF THE PERSONHOOD ? 
 When lawmakers or judges decide to grant legal personhood to nature, they 
usually opt to conceptualise nature in a very broad manner. For instance, the 
Ecuadorian Constitution decided to grant rights to Pacha Mama,  ‘ where life is 
reproduced and occurs ’. No specifi c delimitation of nature is put forward here. 40 
However, in most other jurisdictions, parliaments as well as national courts 
have opted to grant certain legal rights to specifi c ecosystems. In New Zealand, 
for instance, this was the case for the Whanganui River (Te Awa Tupua Act) 
and the forest Te Urewera (Te Urewera Act). 41 It is notable that none of the 
recently adopted legislation contemplates an explicit recognition of the rights 
of particular endangered species, although some lawsuits have already been 
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initiated on behalf of an endangered species. 42 As for the lawsuits initiated 
on behalf of captive chimpanzees and killer whales, they have received a non-
favourable appraisal by the U.S. courts until now. 43 In Argentina, similar claims 
related to animals held in captivity received a more positive treatment, 44 and an 
Indian court recently upheld that  ‘ like humans, animals also have natural rights 
which ought to be recognized ’. 45 
 5.2. WHAT TYPE OF LEGAL RIGHTS ARE RECOGNISED ? 
 Th e next question that arises is which substantive rights are to be granted to 
nature. As of today, a diverse picture emerges. Th e Ecuadorian Constitution, 
for instance, shows a remarkably progressive approach, granting nature the 
right to exist, to maintain its integrity as an ecosystem, and to regenerate  ‘ its 
life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes ’. 46 In addition, 
nature also has the right to be restored. 47 Interestingly, some U.S. ordinances 
go one step further and explicitly recognise the right of nature to fl ourish, 48 
while the legislation in New Zealand basically restricts itself to recognising said 
ecosystems as legal persons with  ‘ all the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a 
legal person ’. 49 
 5.3. STANDING AND GUARDIANSHIP ? 
 A last point to be addressed is the issue of standing, which was central to Stone ’ s 
plea for granting rights to nature. In jurisdictions like Ecuador, everyone can and 
should defend the environment. 50 Th is could be framed as an  ‘ actio popularis ’ 




 51  See for instance: Te Urewera Act 2014, Public Act, no. 51, section 21. 
 52  For a detailed analysis see:  C.M.  Kaufmann and  P.M.  Martin ,  ‘ Can Rights of Nature Make 
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by the court or the legislation. In New Zealand a mixed guardianship approach 
prevailed. For instance, the rights of the river Te Awa Tupua are to be defended 
by representatives both of the Maori communities and of the New Zealand 
government. 51 
 5.4. HIERARCHY OF NORMS AND NATURE ? 
 Recognising the rights of nature does not imply that these rights will automatically 
prevail. Evidently, the inclusion of rights of nature in the constitutional legal 
order will enhance its legal relevance. Th is is the case in Ecuador, where more 
recent case-law has illustrated the transversal character of the rights of nature, 
which also allows them to override property rights in some instances. Even 
so, this jurisprudence is still in fl ux. 52 At the other end of the spectrum, New 
Zealand ’ s Te Awa Tupa Act seems to underscore the systemic premise it is based 
on: the river now enjoys statutory personhood and can no longer be privatised 
for private economic interests. However, this has not yet led to a transfer of the 
existing property rights in the riverbed. 
 6. THE BROADER LEGAL-PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE 
 It is fair to say that Stone ’ s ideas did not pass unnoticed. Stone himself proactively 
anticipated some of the predictable criticism that would befall him. 
 Th roughout legal history, each successive extension of rights to some new entity has 
been  … a bit unthinkable. We are inclined to suppose the rightlessness of rightless 
 ‘ things ’ to be a decree of Nature, not a legal convention acting in support of some 
status quo. 53 
 Yet how should we appraise the most common and persistent objections ? 
 6.1. A SOCIAL CONTRACT VERSUS CONTRAT NATUREL ? 
 An oft en recurring argument is that nonhumans are not part of the social contract 
that is underpinning our society. For instance, when dealing with a claim fi led 
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on behalf of a chimpanzee kept in captivity, the New York Supreme Court held 
that  ‘ legal personhood has consistently been defi ned in terms of both rights 
and duties ’. Th e Court fi nally held that it was the chimpanzee ’ s  ‘ incapability to 
bear any legal responsibilities and societal duties that renders it inappropriate to 
confer upon chimpanzees  … legal rights ’. 54 Th is train of thought is reminiscent 
of Rawls ’ contractarianism, which is famously highlighted in his magnum opus 
 A Th eory of Justice . 55 As animals are merely  ‘ moral patients ’, Rawls posited that 
 ‘ there are no requirements at all with regard to them ’. 56 
 Although this skeptical stance appears persuasive, it is certainly not fl awless 
either. For instance, human moral patients, such as incompetents, also lack 
the capacity to express their will. 57 Even if incompetents or, for instance, small 
children, have no direct duties towards us, this does not entail that they are 
rightless. Moreover, recent research 58 has given more credit to Lovelock ’ s 
Gaia theory, which holds that the combined physical, chemical and biological 
components of the earth system regulate the planet so as to maintain it as a 
habitat for life. 59 In several studies, it has now been acknowledged that the weak 
version of the Gaia theory  – which states that there are close links between 
the evolution of life and the environment, and that biology aff ects the physical 
and chemical environment  – is credible. But on a more fundamental level, one 
should note that social contract arguments, which were put forward during 
the Enlightenment by political philosophers like Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau, 
typically posit that individuals consent, either explicitly or tacitly, to surrender 
some of their freedoms and to submit to the authority (of the ruler, or to the 
decision of a majority) in exchange for protection of their remaining individual 
rights or maintenance of the social order. In a manner similar to the social contract 
theorists, the French philosopher Michel Serres suggested that mankind should 
sign a  ‘ natural contract ’ with the earth to bring balance and reciprocity to our 
relations with the planet that gives us life. 60 Th us, it remains perfectly possible 
to rethink the existing social contract theories of emerging ecological insights, 
which mitigate the anthropocentric underpinnings of our existing normative 
frameworks and lay more emphasis on the interdependence of humans and 
nature. Diff erently put, revisiting Serres ’ approach, would basically come down 
to swapping an exclusively human-centred fi ctitious social contract for a more 




 61  H.  Rolston ,  ‘ Rights and Responsibilities on the Home Planet ’ ( 1993 )  18  Yale Journal of 
International Law  251 . 
 62  P.  Graham ,  ‘ Th e Will Th eory of Rights: A Defence ’ ( 1996 )  15 ( 3 )  Law and Philosophy  257 . 
 63  J.  Raz ,  Th e Morality of Freedom ,  Clarendon Press ,  Oxford  1986 , pp. 178 – 182. 
 64  Y.N.  Harari ,  ‘ Th e myth of free will ’ ,  Th e Guardian ( 14 September 2018 ) ,  https://www.
theguardian.com/books/2018/sep/14/yuval-noah-harari-the-new-threat-to-liberal-
democracy . 
 65  T.  Pietrzykowski ,  Personhood Beyond Humanism. Animals, Chimeras, Autonomous Agents 
and the Law ,  Springer ,  2018 , p. 76. 
 66  M. Rowlands,  ‘ Th e kindness of beasts. Dogs rescue their friends and elephants care for 
injured kin  – humans have no monopoly on moral behaviour ’ ,  https://aeon.co/essays/if-
a-lion-did-a-good-deed-would-we-understand-it . 
 6.2. WHY RIGHTS ? 
 As regards the usage of the concept of  ‘ rights ’, Rolston posited that  ‘ the concept 
of rights that has worked so well to protect human dignity is a hallmark of recent 
cultural progress. Th e rights model, however, proves troublesome when used to 
protect the biological world ’. 61 While powerful at fi rst sight, the criticism does 
not necessary hold up under scrutiny. Irrespective of the fact that some human 
beings are  ‘ mere ’ moral patients, which prevents them from expressing their own 
desires and beliefs, it is also vital to reiterate that there are two competing theories 
underlying the concept of subjecthood in law. On the one hand, supporters of 
the so-called will or choice theories assume that rights are the protection of the 
rights-holder ’ s free will, freedom of choice or a range of possibilities to make 
decisions about the self. 62 Yet champions of the so-called interest theories, such 
as Joseph Raz, approach rights as interests that the lawmakers regard as deserving 
of legal protection against third parties. 63 So, if we decide to grant legal rights to 
corporations and incompetents, why not do the same for rivers and animals ? 
 Along similar lines, the notion of rights is closely related to the concept of 
moral responsibility. Th e Kantian principle  ‘ ought implies can ’, presupposes that 
morality is based upon the premise that you are capable of choosing what to do. 
Enter the notion of free will. Yuval Noah Harari held that 
 [h]umans certainly have a will  – but it isn ’ t free. You cannot decide what desires 
you have. You don ’ t decide to be introvert or extrovert, easy-going or anxious, gay 
or straight. Humans make choices  – but they are never independent choices. Every 
choice depends on a lot of biological, social and personal conditions that you cannot 
determine for yourself. 64 
 If we accept that our morality is rooted more in our genes than in our rational 
thought, then we ought to question the human exceptionalism underpinning 
much of the existing legal schemes. 65 As Mark Rowlands puts it:  ‘ Our (human) 
morality is rooted in our biology rather than our intellect ’. 66 Against this 
backdrop, the idea of explicitly  ‘ granting ’ certain rights to nature  – instead of 
human duties towards nature  – no longer appears off -chart. 
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 6.3. WHAT IS PRECISELY IN NATURE ’ S INTEREST ? 
 In line with the above objections, some authors, like Sagoff , mocked Stone ’ s 
usage of rights by stating that it is simply impossible to know what nature ’ s 
interest is.  ‘ Why ’, Sagoff  stated,  ‘ wouldn ’ t Mineral King (mountain) want to host 
a ski resort aft er doing nothing for a billion years ? ’. 67 Th is refutation, even if it 
appears plausible at fi rst sight, also merits further consideration. For one, when 
focusing on animals, recent research has indeed underpinned the premise that 
animals do have certain beliefs and desires. Not only chimpanzees and other 
primates, but also elephants, killer whales and even octopuses display various 
signs of some intelligent behaviour. 68 Yet also with respect to ecosystems, our 
scientifi c understanding has signifi cantly altered over the past years. 69 Even on 
a more global scale, such as ecosystems, the growing body of ecological research 
can be used to understand what nature ’ s interest might exactly be. 
 6.4. THE ULTIMATE CONQUEST OF NATURE ? 
 In line with John Livingston, one could point out a certain paradox when 
endowing nature with legal rights:  ‘ To extend or bestow or recognize rights 
in nature would be, in effect, to domesticate all of nature  – to subsume it 
into the human political apparatus ’ . 70 Along similar lines, one might contend 
that the delineation between nature and culture remains blurry and arbitrary 
at best. Yet this argument only goes so far, as was also highlighted by Peter 
Burdon. 71 Ultimately, human beings are inevitably limited to using language to 
describe the reality they are inhabiting. It cannot be contested that  ‘ granting ’ 
rights to nature is to be seen as a major step towards a less anthropocentric 
approach to environmental governance. And in a certain way, it is also a more 
consequential approach. When NGOs file lawsuits to save protected species, 
such as wolves or hamsters, what really is at stake is the viewpoint of these 
animals? 72 In essence, such lawsuits focus on the ecological requirements of 
the endangered species, not on the statutory objectives or property interests 
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 7. DO WE REALLY NEED IT IN THE EU ? 
 As alluded to in the introduction, nature has not been vested with explicit legal 
rights in the EU legal order. At least, that is the common believe of most scholars. 
As of today, for instance, no explicit reference to rights of nature can be found in 
primary EU law. Of course, this does not mean that the EU legal order does 
not lay down certain human protection duties towards nature. Equally, it 
might be conceivable to argue that certain implicit legal rights are recognised 
in the EU legal order. Oft en the distinction between duties-based protection 
and rights-based approaches is not clear-cut. For instance, Article  3 of the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU) puts  ‘ sustainable development ’ at the 
centre of the EU ’ s internal market, specifying that the  ‘ internal market  … shall 
work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic 
growth  … and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment ’ . And although the practical relevance of these norms in lawsuits 
remains fairly limited, 73 we should certainly not lose sight of the broader 
picture. Th is has prompted some scholars, such as Julien B é taille, to argue 
that EU environmental law is less anthropocentric than it used to be. 74 In this 
section, I argue that while this hypothesis indeed has some merits, it should 
not lead us to dismiss the rights-based approach altogether. 
 7.1. THE EU AS ENVIRONMENTAL FRONTRUNNER 
 Not seldomly, the EU prides itself on its remarkable track record of environmental 
legislation. At fi rst glance, this self-praise seems justifi ed; from the implementation of 
the fi rst EU environmental action programme to the adoption of several progressive 
environmental directives like the Wild Birds Directive. 75 Whereas the EU ’ s protected 
nature has not been explicitly vested with the right to exist, the environmental 
principles laid down in the TFEU as well as secondary legislation have certainly 
strengthened environmental protection over the past decades. It is evidently impossible 
to treat all relevant pieces of EU environmental legislation in the context of this 
chapter. 76 Reference has to be made to the 2000 EU ’ s Water Framework Directive, 77 
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which compelled the Member States to achieve good qualitative and quantitative 
status of all water bodies (including marine waters up to one nautical mile from shore) 
by 2015. No legal personhood is granted to rivers, yet the legislation contains several 
stringent principles, such as a standstill obligation to be observed when granting 
permits. 78 A recent attempt to apply the  ‘ the polluter pays ’ principle is off ered by the 
2014 Environmental Liability Directive, which also requires preventive and remedial 
action in the context of  ‘ pure ’ ecological damage, 79 and thus at least partly implements 
one of Stone ’ s primary suggestions. 
 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the EU has adopted two pieces of 
legislation explicitly aimed at halting the biodiversity loss within its territory. Th e 
aforementioned Birds Directive, which was later complemented by the more cross-
cutting Habitats Directive, not only explicitly protected hundreds of endangered 
species within the EU but also obliged the Member States to designate the most 
ecologically valuable parts of their territory as protected sites (better known as 
 ‘ Natura 2000 sites ’ ). Again, these directives do not explicitly grant substantive 
 ‘ legal rights ’, such as the right to exist, to certain species or ecosystems; rather, they 
put forward a more traditional governmental approach, whereby the competent 
authorities at the national level are tasked to designate the most vulnerable sites 
on their territory and, subsequently, to implement stricter permitting policies and 
conservation schemes aimed at the recovery of these sites. A similar approach 
surfaces with respect to strictly protected species, such as the wolves and hamsters 
that were mentioned in the introduction to this contribution. 
 7.2.  PROGRESSIVE CASE-LAW DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS 
 ‘ EARTH JURISPRUDENCE ’ ? 
 In the jurisprudence of the CJEU some traces of eco-centrism are also noticeable. 
Th ree specifi c progressive trends can be identifi ed.  First , since 2008 the CJEU has 
consistently spawned very progressive jurisprudence when it comes to the 
standing of environmental NGOs before national courts. This led the CJEU, 
for instance, to grant standing to a Slovakian NGO that was challenging the 
legality of hunting regulations regarding protected Brown bears. 80 In doing 
so, the CJEU highlighted that when appraising the  locus standi of NGOs, 
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property-related arguments. 81 Of course, these NGOs still need to 
demonstrate that the legal action squarely falls within the scope of their 
statutory provisions. Interestingly, NGOs can partly rely on the European 
Commission, which does not shy away from taking Member States to the EU 
courts whenever they implement management strategies that blatantly endanger 
the survival of certain habitats and species, as was recently demonstrated by 
the halting of the illegal logging in the Bialowieza Forest. 82 As a result, one 
might submit that both the environmental NGOs and the EU Commission 
can partly act as guardian of endangered EU protected nature. 
 Second , the CJEU recently also underlined that the EU protected habitats 
and species are to be approached as the EU ’ s common heritage, thereby at least 
implicitly underscoring their intrinsic value. 83 Most prominently, the CJEU rejected 
the acceptability of destructive forestry practices in the vulnerable Bialowieza 
Forest in Poland with reference to Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, which 
prevents national authorities from authorising plans and/or projects that put 
in jeopardy the integrity of the protected site. 84 Irreparable damage cannot be 
tolerated, unless the strict derogation clause is applied. 85 In recent jurisprudence, 
the CJEU consistently underlined the prevalence of the precautionary principle 
in this respect, prompting national authorities to apply the  ‘ in dubio pro natura ’ 
rationale in the context of restorative actions. 86 Regarding protected species, the 
CJEU has persistently broadened the substantive scope of the protection duties 
included in Article  12(1) of the Habitats Directive. 87 Bypassing these rules is 
only possible by way of derogation. And these exceptions are to be interpreted 
narrowly. 88 Even when applying the derogation clauses, for instance in the 
specifi c context of wolf culling, the CJEU has underlined the importance of 
science-based decision-making. 89 Th ese jurisprudential evolutions all contribute 
to a more encompassing protection of EU protected species, while also leaving 
room for taking into consideration the intrinsic value of unique ecosystems or 
even individual specimens of threatened species, such as Gray wolves. 
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 Th ird , recent case-law developments have also highlighted the restoration 
imperative contained in several EU environmental directives, such as the EU 
Habitats Directive, which also hints towards a more ecocentric understanding 
of the existing environmental protection statutes. In its recent case-law, for 
instance, the CJEU seems to prioritise restoration of strictly protected species, 
such as wild hamsters, whose populations have dwindled over the past decades. 90 
Likewise, the CJEU clarifi ed that Member States are equally obliged to designate 
sites which at present harbour relatively little actual biodiversity but which 
possess important restoration features. 91 More importantly, the continuation 
of ongoing and authorised activities in such areas can be challenged through 
Article  6(2) of the Habitats Directive when it confl icts with the restoration 
imperative. 92 
 7.3. MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE SHORTCOMINGS ? 
 In spite of all the above-mentioned praise and progressive jurisprudence, 
the EU legal order still falls short of many of the self-evident substantive 
underpinnings that ought to prevail in a jurisdiction where rights of nature 
are to be approached as constitutional bedrock. For one, it is a well-known 
fact that the prevailing case-law of the CJEU with respect to the admissibility 
requirements for direct actions against EU acts precludes public interest 
litigation at the EU level. 93 This is not a merely theoretical issue, since many of 
the EU decisions regarding pesticides, GMOs and fisheries have an important 
bearing on European ecosystems. 94 One of the more fundamental shortcomings 
in terms of substantive protection is the apparent lack of an imperative to 
preserve ecological integrity in the EU treaties, alongside the notable absence 
of an overarching no-net-loss instrument with binding effects in secondary 
EU law. It is true that the EU Nature Directives have helped in protecting large 
swaths of vulnerable habitats and species across the European continent. Even 
so, the existing protection regime prioritises the most endangered sites and 
species, leaving several less  ‘ charismatic ’ species unprotected ’ . Recent research 
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almost the same amount as all invertebrates put  together. 95 Moreover, the 
derogation clauses that are present in the majority of the above-mentioned EU 
environmental directives leave ample room for anthropocentrism to prevail 
 ‘ via the backdoor ’ . In addition, endowing all nature in the EU with legal 
personhood would evidently also require a systemic recalibration of nature 
protection in terms of territorial scope. Whereas the recognition of the legal 
rights of certain ecosystems that already have been accorded a legal status 
under the 1992 EU Habitats Directive, still appears to be in line with a more 
progressive understanding of EU law, this would imply a genuine paradigm 
shift in property law when also applied in urban zones and agricultural 
sites. This conclusion is exacerbated by the lack of an effective integration 
of ecological integrity as a seminal yardstick in the other sectoral policies 
of the EU, such as fisheries and agriculture. 96 If the existing environmental 
protection duties are already poorly applied within the context of, for instance, 
agricultural policies, what then to expect from a more systemic shift to legal 
personhood for nature in this context ? 
 8.  HOW TO OPERATIONALISE RIGHTS OF NATURE 
IN THE EU ? 
 As of today, it remains delusional to think that the mere introduction of rights 
of nature in the EU legal order will fundamentally bring about an  ‘ ecological 
revolution ’. Th is scepticism is backed up by a recent analysis of the application 
of rights of nature in Ecuador, which seems to attest that explicitly recognising 
rights of nature cannot lead to a transformative shift  towards more sustainable 
practices in an economic growth-based society. 97 However, if we are really 
serious about a shift  towards better environmental performance, more systemic 
changes appear inevitable. Even the European Environment Agency had to 
recognise that a  ‘ recalibration of the existing policy approaches ’ is necessary in 
order to allow a genuinely green economy. 98 And therefore, as the fi nal part of 
this analysis, I will briefl y assess the options left  to operationalise a more rights-
based approach within the context of the European Union. 
Intersentia 203
Rights of Nature as an Unlikely Saviour for the EU’s Th reatened Species and Habitats
 99  See  https://www.citizensforeurope.eu/organisation/rights-of-nature-europe . 
 8.1. THE TEMPTING YET UNCONVINCING SOLUTION ? 
 At fi rst glance, one of the most obvious pathways to do away with the lack 
of explicit recognition of nature ’ s rights in the EU is to pass an EU Directive 
which explicitly recognises the legal rights of all ecosystems within the EU. It is 
therefore no surprise to see the charitable organisation called  ’ Nature ’ s Rights ’ 
advocating a new directive in this regard. 99 Th e draft  proposal explicitly grants 
nature substantive and procedural rights. Yet, a more thorough analysis seems 
to curb the initial enthusiasm. Not only is it very unlikely that this directive 
will be adopted any time soon by the European Parliament and Council, it also 
gives rise to some more fundamental legal obstacles that are to be addressed. 
For one, secondary legislation aimed at revising the dualism between nature and 
Mankind that is certainly implicitly present in the EU treaties will sooner or 
later come into confl ict with the EU constitutional order. One cannot ponder the 
recognition of intrinsic rights of nature without revising seminal concepts like the 
(human) right to property, to give but one example. Likewise, recognising rights 
of ecosystems would also necessitate the revision of many other EU directives. 
 8.2. THE LONG YET UNREALISTIC ROAD ? 
 An alternative route, which almost automatically fl ows from the analysis above, 
assumes that the operationalisation of rights of nature requires their inclusion in 
the EU ’ s constitutional order. Th is taps into the emerging fi eld of environmental 
constitutionalism, which aims to eff ectively cure the current problem of fragmentation 
of environmental law. Th is approach seems more logical, since it would highlight the 
interdependency between the internal market, the human values upon which the 
EU legal order is based and the environment. As of today, however, the cumbersome 
prospect of initiating a lengthy and complex treaty review to introduce rights of 
nature within the EU ’ s constitutional order seems to severely diminish the likely 
success of this  ‘ constitutional ’ scenario. Even when encompassed in the context of a 
more general treaty revision, the question remains whether enough political support 
will be found for the substantive shift  towards the recognition of rights of nature. Of 
course, this leaves the option of an implicit recognition of the legal rights of certain 
ecosystems by the EU constitutional order unaddressed. 
 8.3. MORE PRAGMATIC PATHWAYS ? 
 As the two options dealt with above do not present themselves as a realistic 
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for operationalizing a more rights-based approach to EU environmental law 
in the short run. And to a certain extent, there are. Especially when taking 
into account a more Hohfeldian understanding of the concept of  ‘ right ’ s, 
which focuses more on legal relationships, additional room for recalibration 
becomes available. 100 In Hohfeldian terms, a nature protection framework may 
include a duty to refrain from harming a species. Another way to understand 
this limitation would be to say species have a right to their habitat and a 
right not to be harmed. As hinted at above, a clear case can be made for the 
EU Nature Directives to already grant certain habitats and species a  ‘ right ’ , 
or, as Stone puts it,  ‘ an interest than can be infringed ’ . 101 Zooming in on the 
above-mentioned strictly protected species, such as Gray wolves or European 
hamsters, Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive basically lays down a list of 
negative and positive duties towards protected species. This raises the question 
whether one could not try to reframe these duties as  ‘ rights ’ owned by species. 
For instance, the duty not to kill wolves, as put forward in Article  12(1)(a) 
of the Habitats Directive, might be reframed as a  ‘ right to life ’ endowed to the 
species. Similarly, the protection of certain parts of the habitat of protected 
species, such as the burrows of wild hamsters, grants these species a certain 
property right. 102 At face value, this reinterpretation of the existing rights appears 
farfetched. Yet when one puts forward a prohibition on killing certain species, 
one basically creates a positive duty for the government to protect endangered 
species from harmful actions by third parties. 103 Likewise, every time authorities 
decide to protect the burrows or dens of a species, one basically grants it a 
proto-property right. 104 And even if, as stated above, the rights granted to 
the said species are not absolute, they still remain very potent precursors 
of environmental protection. Recognising that certain endangered species 
possess some kind of property rights would evidently oblige us humans to 
refrain from deliberate interference with their habitats. But is that not exactly 
what we are already obliged to do, at least when applying the strict protection 
schemes included in EU law ? 105 
 One possible pathway to further the rights-based approach to nature 
would consist in bringing more cases forward in the interest and on behalf 
of endangered species under EU law. Th is is not as novel as it seems: several 
lawsuits have already been initiated in the United States with endangered 
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species as plaintiff s, alleging failures to protect their habitat as required under 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In the renowned  Palila case , the Ninth 
Circuit Court ruled that the Palila bird  ‘ has legal status and wings its way into 
the federal court as a plaintiff  in its own right ’ . 106 Similar symbolic victories 
were scored in subsequent cases, including legal proceedings regarding the 
Northern Spotted Owl. 107 In all these cases standing was granted for the 
endangered species. However, it should be pointed out that that in none of 
these cases was the species the sole plaintiff . And although this case law was 
subsequently revisited in other jurisprudence, 108 it has certainly hit a nerve 
amongst US courts. 
 Th e afore-mentioned litigation strategy has remained largely unexplored 
in the EU. As of today, however, the EU treaties do not include an outright 
prohibition on the vesting of legal personhood in non-human objects. One 
might thus claim that EU law as such does not necessarily bar lawsuits on behalf 
of endangered species. In any event, environmental protection is treated as a 
shared competence within the EU legal framework. In this respect, one might 
therefore argue that national courts and/or national legislation are still allowed 
to grant legal rights to nature. Or, at the very least, they might refer the matter 
to the CJEU through a preliminary reference, which grants the EU judges the 
opportunity to shed their light on this very topical issue. 
 9. CONCLUSION 
 On a concluding note, it needs to be reiterated that, if not accompanied by 
a comprehensive revision of the existing institutional, political and economic 
structures, rights of nature will not bring about any short-term fi x for the 
degraded environment. Certainly, this more eco-centric approach is not to be 
treated as a panacea or a substitute for the enforcement of existing protection 
statutes. Th is would be a logical fallacy: there simply is no easy fi x for our current 
environmental predicament if no systemic shift  towards a less consumption-
based society is implemented in the short run. Even so, the rights of nature 
narrative puts forward a new language and framework which might be more 
suitable for dealing with environmental issues in the Anthropocene. Th is case-
study of recent case-law developments of the EU underscored the potential for 
a more gradual move towards the implicit recognition of certain legal rights for 
EU protected species, habitats and ecosystems, even when this is not explicitly 
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would no longer be put forward as a short-term fi x, but rather as the result of 
a incremental ecological understanding and re-interpretation of the existing 
protection duties towards nature and the wider environment. In this respect, 
I also want to refer to Th omas Berry, one of the most outspoken modern 
advocates for the rights of nature. When faced with the multitude of objections, 
Berry ultimately underlined the pragmatic approach underpinning the rights 
of nature movement:  ‘ the language of rights answers the legal establishment 
in its own terms ’ . 109 As Chapron et al. noted,  ‘ [w]hen people and corporations 
have rights, nature frequently loses  … . Rights of nature may help prevent this 
one-sided outcome ’ . 110 And this is exactly what also appears to be possible in 
the EU legal order. 
